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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Appellant, : Case No. 920614-CA 
v. : Priority No. 15 
WAYNE D. POTTER, : 
Defendant-Appellee. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Appellee refers the Court to the State's statement of the 
Jurisdiction and Nature of Proceedings as it is sufficient. 
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Should this Court affirm the trial court's decision to grant 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress and Defendant's Motion to 
Dismiss on the basis that there was no reasonable suspicion to 
stop Defendant? Trial court rulings on reasonable suspicion 
are not reversed unless they are clearly erroneous. State v. 
Mendoza. 748 P.2d 181, 183 (Utah 1987); and State v. Sykes. 198 
Utah Adv. Rep. 35, 36 (Utah App. 1992). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and 
Article One Section 14 of the Utah Constitution provide, in 
pertinent part, 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
i 
{ 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches 
seizures, shall not be violated.... 
Utah Code Ann. section 77-7-15 (1990), provides: \ 
A peace officer may stop any person in a public place 
when he has a reasonable suspicion to believe he has 
committed or is in the act of committing or is attempting to 
commit a public offense and may demand his name, address 
and an explanation of his actions. < 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with unlawful possession of a 
concealed weapon, and with two counts of unlawful possession of 
a controlled substance. The two narcotics charges were based 
upon a small amount of marijuana, and cocaine residue found in 
a small container. 
Defendant moved to suppress the evidence on the basis that 
there was no reasonable suspicion to stop the Defendant in his 
vehicle. The trial Court granted this motion by finding that 
the fact of Defendant coming to and going from a house that was 
under surveillance because a drunk driver said a pot party was 
going on there did not give rise to reasonable suspicion that 
the Defendant was engaged in any criminal activity. 
The trial court subsequently denied the State's Motion to 
Reconsider, and granted Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. The 
State has now appealed the dismissal of the prosecution on the 
basis that there was reasonable suspicion. 
2 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On February 16, 1991, Deputy Gayle Jensen of the Emery 
County Sheriff's office stopped a suspect for suspicion of DUI. 
(R. 100) 
2. The DUI suspect, who was obviously intoxicated, and in 
an effort to obtain favorable treatment on his soon-to-be-
pending DUI case, told the deputy that there was a pot party 
going on at the house of Devon Potter which was nearby. (R. 
100, 127-32) . 
3. Other officers were summoned to the scene. One of these 
officers was Deputy Mangum. The officers began surveillance on 
the home of Devon Potter while they waited for a search warrant 
to be prepared. (R. 166-67). 
4. The Defendant in this Case, Wayne Potter, was not 
identified by the informant as being at the home of Devon 
Potter at the time of the alleged pot party. (R. 100). 
5. One of the officers at or near the scene was Trooper 
Horrocks of the Utah Highway Patrol. While at the scene 
Trooper Horrocks observed a person get out of a vehicle near 
the trailer being observed, go into the trailer, come out a few 
minutes later, get into the vehicle and drive away. (R. 100). 
6. At the time of this observation, Trooper Horrocks did 
not know the identity of the person going to and leaving from 
the trailer. (R. 101) . 
3 
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7. Deputy Mangum radioed Trooper Horrocks and requested 
that he stop the vehicle that had just left near the trailer, 
and detain the occupants pending arrival of the search warrant. i 
(R. 101). 
8. Without any other facts that would indicate any illegal 
activity on the part of the occupants of the vehicle, Trooper 
Horrocks stopped the vehicle for the purpose of detaining the 
occupants until further instructions were received or a search 
warrant for the trailer was obtained. (R. 101). 
9. Although Trooper Horrocks did not know who was driving 
the vehicle at the time of the stop, upon approaching the 
vehicle he recognized the Defendant, Wayne Potter, as the 
driver, and by prior experience with the Defendant, he believed 
that there may be some danger to himself if he did not conduct 
a search for weapons. (R. 101). 
10. Trooper Horrocks then conducted a search for weapons by 
having the occupants, including Defendant, empty their pockets. 
A concealed firearm was discovered on the person of the 
Defendant. (R. 100). 
11. Trooper Horrocks then arrested Defendant for carrying a 
concealed weapon, and then proceeded to conduct a search 
incident to the arrest. During this search the trooper 
discovered on the person of the Defendant some marijuana, some 
4 
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pills, and a small container containing what was later analyzed 
to be cocaine residue. (R. 102). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court applied the correct legal standard in 
determining reasonable suspicion. This is evident by a review 
of the entirety of the court's ruling on the motion to 
suppress, and the court's findings, and the court's ruling on 
the State's motion to reconsider. 
By applying the standard of reasonable suspicion, it is 
obvious that the fact that Defendant simply came to and left 
from a house where it was alleged that a pot party was going 
on, does not give rise to reasonable suspicion to stop the 
Defendant, especially when this Court has found no reasonable 
suspicion in similar cases. 
ARGUMENT 
A. THE TRIAL COURT DID APPLY THE CORRECT LEGAL STANDARD IN 
DETERMINING REASONABLE SUSPICION 
The State first argues that the trial court's ruling that 
there was no reasonable suspicion to stop the Defendant should 
be overturned on the basis that the judge, in making his 
ruling, applied the more stringent "arrest" standard instead of 
the reasonable suspicion standard set forth in Utah Code Ann. 
section 77-7-15 (1990) . This argument by the State is not 
5 
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valid. A review of the entirety of the judge's decision will 
clearly show that the correct legal standard was applied. 
The main impetus for the State's argument is the judge's use ( 
of the term "reasonable cause" in the court's denial of the 
State's Motion to Reconsider. In that ruling the judge stated 
that "no matter how you consider the facts in this case, they < 
do not establish reasonable cause to believe that the Defendant 
was committing any crime or had committed any public offense at 
this time and place that would justify his apprehension and 
detention." (R. 97). However, it must be remembered that this 
is language from the court's ruling on the State's Motion to 
Reconsider. If we look directly to the court's ruling on the 
Motion to Suppress, it is abundantly clear that the correct 
standard was applied, and that what the judge meant to say in 
his later ruling on the Motion to Reconsider was "reasonable 
suspicion". 
In its ruling on the Motion to Suppress, the trial court 
stated that "thus, a stop can be justified only upon a showing 
of reasonable suspicion that defendant was committing a crime 
or that he was stopped incident to a traffic offense". (R. 
79). In support of this statement the court cited the case of 
State v. Roth. 181 UAR 25, which is a case dealing with the 
issue of reasonable suspicion. The court further stated that: 
in order to satisfy the reasonable suspicion inquiry, it 
must be determined if, from facts apparent to Officer 
6 
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Horrocks, and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, 
that he would reasonably suspect that the Defendant was 
committing, or had committed, a crime prior to the stop. 
This suspicion must be based upon articulated objective 
facts then apparent to the officer. (R. 80). 
This is exactly the reasonable suspicion standard articulated 
in the Statute and in the numerous reasonable suspicion cases 
announced by the Utah appellate courts. The statute provides 
an officer may stop a person if he has "...reasonable suspicion 
to believe he has committed or is in the act of committing or 
is attempting to commit a public offense...." The trial court 
used almost the same, or essentially the same language as set 
forth above. 
In Terry v. Ohio, which is the threshold case on reasonable 
suspicion, the United States Supreme Court held that "the 
police officer must be able to point to specific and 
articulable facts which, taken together with rational 
inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the intrusion." 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1880 (1968), as 
quoted in State v. Menke, 787 P. 2d 537, 541 (Utah App. 1990). 
Once again, this is the same or essentially the same language 
used by the trial court in setting forth the legal standard of 
review in its ruling on the motion to suppress. 
In applying the correct legal standard to the facts of this 
case, the trial court concluded that: 
there was nothing in what Officer Horrocks knew or in what 
was conveyed to him that would create reasonable suspicion 
7 
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of illegal conduct upon the part of the Defendant. There 
was nothing at the time that any of the deputies of the 
Emery County Sheriff's Office could factually articulate 
that would give rise to reasonable suspicion that the 
Defendant had committed or was committing a crime except < 
his unidentified brief appearance on the premises as 
indicated. The courts have consistently held that this 
fact alone is not enough to create reasonable suspicion. 
(R. 82) . 
After reading this, the only conclusion is that the trial court 
did consider the appropriate standard in determining reasonable 
suspicion, and the State's argument in this regard is a 
diversion from the fact of the matter, which is that there was 
no reasonable suspicion to make the stop, and that the 
Defendant's constitutional rights were violated. 
In addition, the trial court used the term "reasonable 
cause" in its Conclusions of Law only in reference to possible 
illegal activity going on inside the trailer, and not in 
regards to the standard to be applied in determining the 
illegality of the stop. (R. 102). 
In arguing that the trial court applied the wrong legal 
standard, the state has enamored itself with the phrase 
"minimal objective justification" from the case of United 
States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 109 S. Ct. 1581, 1585 (1989). 
The obvious attempt in referring to this phrase is to 
"minimize" the reasonable suspicion standard to almost nothing. 
It is undisputed by Defendant that the standard for reasonable 
suspicion is less than that for probable cause. However, what 
8 
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the state is tending to forget is the first part of the 
reasonable suspicion standard - that the suspicion must be 
"reasonable". And as the courts have interpreted this 
standard, they have concluded consistently, as set forth above, 
that the officer must be able to point to specific articulable 
and objective facts which indicate that the Defendant has 
committed or is attempting to commit a crime. That is the 
standard. Not "minimal objective justification". 
The State interestingly notes in its brief that in the Utah 
Cases since Sokolow, that have held that there was no 
reasonable suspicion, not one of those cases "cites the correct 
'minimal objective justification' standard...." (See 
Appellant's brief at p. 17). The Utah appellate courts 
obviously know what there doing, and the reason why there is 
no citation to that phrase is because that is not the 
standard. All "minimal objective justification" is, is another 
way of saying that the standard for showing reasonable 
suspicion is lower than for probable cause. Simply put, the 
standard for determining whether the officer was entitled to 
stop the defendant in this case is reasonable suspicion, not 
"minimal objective justification". 
B. THE DEFENDANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS WERE VIOLATED 
BECAUSE THERE WAS NO REASONABLE SUSPICION FOR THE STOP 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides, "the right of the people to be secure in their 
9 
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( 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated...." U.S. Const, 
amend. IV. (Article I Section 14 of the Utah Constitution 
contains the same language). 
When a police officer stops a vehicle, a "seizure" occurs, 
giving rise to Fourth Amendment protections. State v. Holmes, 
774 P.2d 506, 507 (Utah App. 1989), as quoted in State v. 
Sykes, 198 Utah Adv. Rep. 35, 36, (1992). 
This Court has held that, "to pass under the Fourth 
Amendment, the seizure must be based on specific articulable 
facts which, together with rational inferences drawn from them, 
would lead a reasonable person to conclude defendant had 
committed or was about to commit a crime." State v. Trujillo, 
739 P.2d 85, 88 (Utah App. 1987). In emphasizing the 
"objectiveness" of this standard, the United States Supreme 
Court has stated, 
In making that assessment it is imperative that the facts be 
judged against an objective standard....Anything less would 
invite intrusions upon constitutionally guaranteed rights 
based upon nothing more substantial than unarticulated 
hunches, a result this Court has consistently refused to 
sanction. 
Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22, 88 S. Ct. at 1880. 
The facts in this case do not indicate in any way that 
Defendant was engaged in any criminal conduct whatsoever. The 
facts boil down to Defendant going to and leaving from a house 
that was under surveillance because a drunk driver, in an 
10 
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effort to get a break on his case, said a pot party was going 
on at the house. That is all. And, as this Court has 
previously held, that type of activity does not give rise to a 
reasonable suspicion that the Defendant is engaged in criminal 
activity. If it was concluded that simply being in the area of 
suspected criminal activity gives rise to reasonable suspicion, 
that would mean that every client that came to and from my 
office could be stopped and questioned if the police for some 
reason suspected that I was engaging in a conspiracy to defraud 
someone, or if the police believed I had possession of stolen 
property. This type of behavior is obviously unreasonable, but 
that is exactly what the state wants this Court to approve. 
The facts in Sykes are very similar to this case. In Sykes, 
an officer was conducting surveillance of a home for suspected 
narcotics activity based upon reports from neighbors and from 
an informant. While watching the home, the officer observed 
the defendant drive up, park, and enter the home. 
Approximately three minutes later, the defendant returned to 
her car and drove off. Sykes, 198 Utah Adv. Rep. at 36. The 
officer subsequently stopped the vehicle. This Court then held 
that ,f...the facts do not support a reasonable suspicion that 
defendant was engaged in criminal activity." Id. at 37. The 
mere presence of the Defendant in the area of suspected drug 
activity does not give rise to reasonable suspicion. See Brown 
11 
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v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52, 99 S. Ct. 2637, 2641 (1979), and 
State v. Steward, 806 P.2d 213, 216 (Utah App. 1991). 
The State attempts to distinguish Sykes on the basis that in 
Sykes no warrant had been sought for yet, whereas here, the 
police were in the process of obtaining a warrant. This fact 
does not make any difference. As noted, in Sykes the police 
suspected illegal drug activity based upon complaints from 
neighbors about suspicious activities, information from an 
informant in regards to drug activity at the home, and a 
purchase of cocaine by an undercover agent in the area. 
Actually, there was more "positive" evidence in Sykes about 
drug activity at the house than we have here. In this case all 
we have is the unconfirmed statements of a drunk driver who is 
trying to get a break on his case. In addition, the drunk 
driver did not identify the Defendant as being at the alleged 
pot party, the Defendant came to the house after the drunk 
driver made his statements, and the police did not know the 
identity of Defendant until after he left the house. 
The State also attempts to distinguish Steward by pointing 
out that the defendant in Steward was stopped even before 
reaching the premises. What the State fails to point out is 
that the premises were located in a cul-de-sac, the defendant 
was heading towards the premises in his vehicle, it was about 
11:30 pm., the police had conducted a raid and had definitely 
12 
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found narcotics, and when the defendant observed the police he 
attempted to flee in his vehicle. Steward, 806 P.2d at 216. 
In Steward the police actually knew there was criminal activity 
at the home. Here they only suspected it. Still, this Court 
held there was no reasonable suspicion in Steward, and that 
should be the same result here. 
CONCLUSION 
The Defendant's rights under the Fourth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution, and Article I Section 14 of the 
Utah Constitution forbidding unreasonable searches and seizures 
was violated because there was no reasonable suspicion to stop 
the Defendant. "Absent reasonable suspicion, evidence derived 
from the stop is 'fruit of the poisonous tree' and must be 
excluded." State v. Baird, 763 P.2d 1214, 1216 (Utah App. 
1988). Therefore, this Court should hold that the trial 
court's decision to grant the Motion to Suppress and exclude 
the evidence is not clearly erroneous, and should affirm that 
decision as well as the trial court's decision to dismiss the 
case against Defendant. 
Respectfully submitted this W day of May, 1993. 
Mark T. Ethingtojr 
Attorney for Appellee 
13 
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ADDENDUM 
Trial Court Rulings and Orders 
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I 1 L. C U 
IN' THE SJVEKIH JUDICIAL D*TR!CT COURT 
""•' "'•' "
,
» / T Y 
APR 13 1992 
OFUW-
Ev Depjt] 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR EMERY COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Plaintiff, ; 
vs. 
WAYNE DERRON POTTER, 
Defendant. ] 
I RULING ON MOTION TO | SUPPRESS 
i Criminal No. 1029 
-
The Defendant's Motion to Suppress the evidence in 
this case came on for hearing before the Court on April 6, 
1992. The attorneys were present and the Court heard 
testimony of Trooper Jeff Horrocks and, purusant to 
stipulation of the parties, considered the testimony of 
Officers of the Emery County Sheriff's Department by way of a 
transcript of hearing held on September 16, 1991, on a motion 
to suppress in the case of State v Devon Boyd Potter where 
the incidents leading up to the stop of the Defendant's 
vehicle were covered. 
The Court finds that Officer Horrocks had good cause 
to search the Defendant after he stopped him in his vehicle. 
Although the officer did not know who was driving the vehicle 
until he approached it, he immediately recognized the 
defendant at that time and, by prior experience and general 
reputation, he knew that there may be some danger to himself 
if he carried out his intent to detain the Defendant without 
conducting a search for weapons. 
/in/ »7c 
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The Officer stopped the vehicle with the intent to 
detain the occupants. Once this was done, the occupants were 
technically under arrest since they were not free to leave, 
and the officer has the right, under these circumstances, to 
search for weapons, which he did. In fact, he found a 
firearm concealed on the person of the Defendant in the 
search. 
The question the Court must consider, however, is 
the legality of the stop of the vehicle and the detention of 
the Defendant. If this was done in violation of Defendant's 
constitutional rights, it follows that the evidence recovered 
from the search incident to that detention cannot be used as 
evidence. 
There are several recent cases that have been 
considered by the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in 
Utah that analyze this question. They all conclude that 
,!Thus, 'a stop can be justified only upon a showing of 
reasonable suspicion that defendant was committing a crime, 
or that he was stopped incident to a traffic offense"1. 
(State v. Roth, 181 UAR 25) 
2 
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In order to satisfy the reasonable suspicion 
inquiry, it must be determined if, from the facts apparent to 
Officer Horrocks, and the reasonable inference drawn there-
from, that he would reasonably suspect that the Defendant was 
committing, or had committed, a crime prior to the stop. 
This suspicion must be based upon articulated objective facts 
then apparent to the officer. 
Officer Horrocks had a right to rely on the 
information given to him by other officers as a basis to 
support his reasonable suspicion, but only if the basis for 
the matters relayed were also based upon articulated facts. 
Officer Horrocks was told by Deputy Mangum that the trailer 
home that they were observing from about one-half block away 
was under surveilance while a search warrant was being 
secured. He further informed him that an informant, who had 
just previously been arrested for drunk driving, had told the 
officers that there was a pot party going on in the trailer 
and that marijuana was present. 
Horrocks further stated that while observing the 
trailer he saw a person get out a car near the trailer, go 
to the trailer, and then go to the car, get into the car and 
begin to drive away. At that point, Officer Mangum 
instructed Officer Horrocks to stop the car and to detain the 
occupants pending the arrival of the search warrant. 
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Officer Horrocks followed these instructions and 
stopped the vehicle with the intent to detain its occupants 
pending the arrival of the search warrant, or pending further 
instructions. Without any other facts that would indicate 
any illegal activity on the part of the occupants of the car, 
the vehicle was stopped. 
The Defendant was not in the house trailer when the 
officers entered it to secure the premises pending the 
receipt of a search warrant, and he was not identified to 
them by the imformant as being in the trailer when the 
informant said he observed marijuana or that a pot party was 
in progress. 
If there was reasonable cause to believe that 
illegal activity was going on inside the trailer at that time, 
there were no articulatable facts connecting the Defendant 
with such activity other than his brief appearance on the 
premises. None of the officers knew who the occupants of the 
vehicle were until it was stopped by Officer Horrocks. Since 
they did not know that the Defendant personally was in the 
vehicle or that he personally was on the premises, the fact 
that they may have known that he was a convicted drug abuser 
is immaterial since this fact was not used by them 
informulating reasonable suspicion. 
bnr
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The attorney for the State in articulating facts 
states that Deputy Gayle Jensen personally observed defendant 
enter and exit the trailer. On review of Deputy Jensen's 
testimony (Transcript, page 32), he did not state that he saw 
the defendant enter and leave but only that he saw a little 
white car leave the trailer. 
There was nothing in what Officer Horrocks knew or 
in what was conveyed to him that would create reasonable 
suspicion of illegal conduct upon the part of the Defendant. 
There was nothing at the time that any of the deputies of the 
Emery County Sheriff's Office could facutally articulate that 
would give rise to reasonable suspicion that the Defendant 
had committed or was committing a crime except his 
unidentified brief appearance on the premises as indicated. 
The Courts have consistently held that this fact 
alone is not enough to create reasonable suspicion. 
Even in cases where the officer has reasonable 
suspicion of illegal activity based upon direction from a 
dispatch officer or from other police officers, and he stops 
a vehicle, he can only stop the vehicle briefly while 
attempting to obtain further information regarding those 
suspicions. (See State v Bruce. 779 P2d 646) 
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Office Horrocks stated that he stopped the vehicle 
to detain the occupants pending further instructions or, the 
Court assumes, until the arrival of the search warrant for 
the trailer, and that his purpose was not to investigate or 
to make further inquiry relative to any suspicions of illegal 
activity. 
For these reasons, THE COURT FINDS that the 
Defendant's constitutional rights were violated, and that the 
stop was not legally made, and that the Motion for Summary 
Judgment is granted. 
The Attorney for the Defendant is directed to make 
formal Findings of Fact and an Order granting the Motion to 
Suppress. ., 
DATED this y g - day of April, 1992. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing RULING ON MOTION TO SUPPRESS by 
depositing the same in the United States Mail, postage 
prepaid, to the following: 
Mark T. Ethington 
DAY AND BARNEY 
Attorneys at Law 
45 East Vine Street 
Murray UT 84107 
Patricia Geary 
Emery County Attorney 
Post Office Box 1099 
Castle Dale UT 84513 
DATED this Q ^ day of April, 1992. 
T^ S ft,J zs A^. w^<fc ri i,i mi 
Secretary 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR EMERY COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. ; 
WAYNE DERRON POTTER, 
Defendant. ] 
I RULING ON MOTION TO 
I RECONSIDER 
i Criminal No. 91-2660 
The State has filed a motion asking the Court to 
reconsider its previous ruling relative to the Defendant's 
Motion to Suppress the Evidence gathered against him. 
In view of the fact that the Court missed the state-
ment by Deputy Jensen found on page 37 of the transcript of his 
testimony, THE COURT WILL grant the Motion and will reconsider 
its previous ruling. 
The statement of the Deputy contained at that page 
still leaves some doubt as to whether or not he recognized the 
Defendant at the time the Defendant left the trailer since his 
statement about seeing him leave came after he had talked to 
Officer Horrocks and the Defendant had been identified to him 
as the driver of the white car. No one whose testimony was 
used for the purpose of this hearing mentions the name of the 
Defendant at anytime prior to the stop and his identification 
being made known by Officer Horrocks. 
Lr 30-9^ 
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The instructions to Officer Horrocks were to stop the white car 
and no mention was made relative to its occupants. 
However, for the sake of this ruling we will assume 
that the Deputy recognized the Defendant as the person who left 
the trailer end drove away in the white car. 
The i still remains that the Defendant was not in 
the trailer at the time the Officers entered, and he was not 
mentioned by the informant as being present at the alleged pot 
party. 
On the contrary, Officer Horrocks said he observed the 
driver of the white car get out of the car, go to the trailer 
and return to the car and drive away. 
No matter how you consider the facts in this case, 
they do not establish reasonable cause to believe that the 
Defendant was committing any crime or had committed a public 
offense at this time and place that would justify his 
apprehension and detention. 
FOR THESE REASONS, the Court affirms its prior ruling 
that the Motion to Suppress be granted. 
DATED this ^^f^dav of April, 1992. 
trudge 
0013mw 
H 9.7 Recorded in Judgment Record 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing RULING ON MOTION TO RECONSIDER by 
depositing the same in the United States Mail, postage 
prepaid, to the following: 
Mark T. Ethington 
Attorney at Law 
DAY AND BARNEY 
45 East Vine Street 
Murray, UT 84107 
Patricia Geary 
EMERY COUNTY ATTORNEY 
P. 0. BOX 249 
Castle Dale UT 84013 
DATED this day of April, 1992, 
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR EMERY COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, | 
Plaintiff, ; 
vs. 
WAYNE DERRON POTTER, 
Defendant. 
i FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
> CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
i Case No. 1029 
The Defendant's Motion to Suppress, previously filed in 
this case, came on for hearing before the Court on April 6, 1992. 
After hearing the testimony of Tropper Jeff Horrocks and 
pursuant to stipulation of the parties, considering the 
testimony of various officers of Emery County as set forth in a 
transcript of a suppression hearing in the case of State v. 
Devon Bovd Potter where the incidents leading up to the stop of 
Defendant's vehicle are set forth, the Court now makes the 
following findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Officer Horrocks was told by Deputy Mangum that the 
trailer home that they were observing from about one-half block 
away was under suerveillance while a search warrant was being 
secured. 
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2. Deputy Mangum further informed Officer Horrocks 
that an informant, who had previously been arrested for drunk 
driving, had told the officers that there was a pot party going 
on in the trailer and that marijuana was present. 
3. While observing the trailer, Officer Horrocks saw a 
person get out of a car near the trailer, go to the trailer and 
then come back to the car a short while later, get into the car 
and begin to drive away. 
4. Officer Gayle Jensen (the officer who stopped the 
DUI suspect) observed the same vehicle leave the trailer. 
5. The Defendant (who was subsequently discovered to 
be the driver of the vehicle) was not in the house trailer when 
the officers subsequently entered it to secure the premises 
pending receipt of a search warrant. 
6. The Defendant was not identified by the informant 
as being in the trailer when the informant said he observed 
marijuana or that a pot party was in progress. 
7. Deputy Jensen, who was on the premises being 
secured, recognized the Defendant as the person who was driving 
away in the car and knew that the Defendant had been previously 
convicted of a drug offense. 
•2-
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8. As the vehicle was leaving the trailer, Deputy 
Mangum, upon instruction from Deputy Jensen, requested Officer 
Horrocks to stop the vehicle and to detain the occupants pending 
arrival of the search warrant. 
9. Without any other facts that would indicate any 
illegal activity on the part of any of the occupants of the car, 
Officer Horrocks then stopped the vehicle with the intent to 
detain the occupants until either the search warrant arrived or 
until further instructions. Officer Horrocks' purpose was not 
to investigate or to make further inquiry relative to any 
suspicions or illegal activity, 
10. Although Officer Horrocks did not know who was 
driving the vehicle before the stop, upon approaching the 
vehicle he immediately recognized the Defendant as the driver of 
the vehicle, and, by prior experience and reputation, he knew 
that there may be some danger to himself if he carried out his 
intent to detain the Defendant without a search for weapons. 
11. Officer Horrocks then conducted a search of the 
occupants, including the Defendant, by having them empty their 
pockets. A concealed firearm was discovered on the person of 
the Defendant during the course of this search. 
• 3 -
101 
, . Recorded in Judgment Record 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
12. Officer Horrocks then arrested the Defendant for 
carrying a concealed weapon, and then searched the Defendant 
incident to this arrest, and during this search he discovered 
some marijuana and some pills and a small container containing 
what was later analyzed as cocaine residue. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. If there was reasonable cause to believe that 
illegal activity was going on inside the trailer, there was no 
articulable facts connecting the Defendant with such activity 
other than his brief appearance on the premises. 
2. There was nothing in what Officer Horrocks knew or 
in what was conveyed to him that would create reasonable 
suspicion of illegal conduct upon the part of the Defendant. 
There was nothing at the time that any of the deputies of the 
Emery County Sheriff's Office could factually articulate that 
would give rise to reasonable suspicion that the Defendant had 
committed or was committing a crime except his brief appearance 
on the premises. 
3. Because there was no reasonable suspicion to stop 
Defendant's vehicle for the purpose of detaining him, the 
Defendant's constitutional rights as set forth in the Fourth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and 
Aarticle I Section 14 of the Utah Constitution prohibiting 
unreasonable searches and seizures was violated, and Defendant's 
Motion to Suppress should be granted. 
Recorded in JudgmentRe^ord 
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4, There was a seizure of Defendant when he was 
detained by Officer Horrocks in that Defendant was technically 
under arrest since he was not free to leave. 
5. Officer Horrocks had good cause to search the 
Defendant after the Defendant was stopped* Howeverf evidence 
discovered as a result of the search should be suppressed as a 
result of the prior illegal stop. 
DATED this / day of May, 1992. 
Sg^BUpfcii, Di'sreRct Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I nailed a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW by depositing the same in the United States Mail, 
postage prepaid, to the following: 
Mark T. Ethington 
DAY AND BARNEY 
Attorneys at Law 
45 East Vine Street 
Murray UT 84107 
Patricia Geary 
Emery County Attorney 
Post Office Box 1099 
Castle Dale UT 84513 
DATED this /A*—dav of May, 1992 
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Mark T. Ethington (4828) 
DAY & BARNEY 
Attorneys for Defendant 
45 E. Vine Street 
Murray, Utah 84107 
Telephone: (801)262-6800 
FILED 
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o . . ^ c C . R W K - C l e r k 
Bv ^ ^ | / L ^ Deputy 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR EMERY COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
WAYNE DERRON POTTER, 
Defendant. 
ORDER ON MOTION TO 
SUPPRESS 
Case No. 1029 
Judge Boyd Bunnell 
The Defendant's Motion to Suppress, previously filed in this 
case, came on for hearing before the Court on April 6, 1992. After 
hearing the testimony of Trooper Jeff Horrocks and, pursuant to 
stipulation of the parties, considering the testimony of various 
officers of Emery County as set forth in a transcript of a 
suppression hearing in the case of State v. Devon Bovd Potter where 
the incidents leading up to the stop of Defendant's vehicle are set 
forth, and pursuant to the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
entered herewith, it is hereby, 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that Defendant's Motion to 
Suppress is granted, and any and all evidence seized from the 
Defendant as a result of the stop and subsequent search in question, 
including but not limited to, a Titan 25 Caliber semi automatic 
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pistol serial number D823944, small plastic tuperware container 
allegedly containing cocaine residue, any alleged cocaine residue, 
marijuana, twelve Tylenol 3 tablets, and various other pills, shall 
be suppressed and not be allowed to be used as evidence against the 
Defendant. 
Dated this /_ day of /W-'IB*'? . 1992. 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Patricia Geary 
Emery County Attorney 
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Mark T. Ethington (4828) 
DAY & BARNEY 
Attorneys for Defendant 
45 E. Vine Street 
Murray, Utah 84107 
Telephone: (801)262-6800 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR EMERY COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : MOTION TO DISMISS 
Plaintiff, : 
vs. : 
WAYNE D. POTTER, : Case No, 1029 
Judge Boyd Bunnell 
Defendant. : 
COMES NOW the Defendant, by and through his attorney, and hereby 
respectfully moves this Court to dismiss with prejudice the 
Information herein for the following reasons. On April 6, 1992, a 
hearing was held before this Court on Defendant's Motion to Suppress 
all of the evidence seized from the Defendant at the time of his 
arrest in this matter. This Court took the matter under advisement 
at that time. On April 9, 1992, this Court entered a written Ruling 
on Motion to Suppress wherein Defendant's motion was granted. On 
April 21, 1992, the State of Utah filed a Motion to Reconsider or for 
Rehearing. On April 28, 1992, this Court entered a written Ruling on 
Motion to Reconsider wherein the State's motion was denied. On May 
7, 1992, this Court entered an Order on Motion to Suppress along with 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law wherein the Defendant's 
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Motion to Suppress was granted. A mailing certificate was attached 
to the Order indicating that a copy of the Order had been delivered 
to Patricia Geary, Emery County Attorney. 
At least thirty (30) days have now elapsed since the filing of 
the Court's Order granting the motion to suppress, and the State has 
not filed an interlocutory appeal. 
Because the State essentially can not make a prima facie case 
against the Defendant due to the granting of the motion to suppress, 
it would be fruitless and a waste of time and resources to proceed 
with a trial of this matter. Furthermore, it is unreasonable to 
continue to let the charges just sit without some type of action on 
them. This may constitute a violation of Defendant's Sixth Amendment 
right to a speedy trial. 
Consequently, the Defendant respectfully requests that the 
Information herein be dismissed with prejudice. 
Dated this /? day of June, 1992. 
Mark T. Ethingto 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that I am employed by the office of Day & Barney and 
that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Motion to 
Dismiss, postage pre-paid, to the following: 
Patricia Geary 
Emery County Attorney 
P.O. Box 249 
Castle Dale, Utah 84513-0249 
on this It) day of June, 1992. 
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By 
MARK T. ETHINGTON (4828) 
DAY & BARNEY 
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT 
45 EAST VINE STREET 
MURRAY, UTAH 84107 
TELEPHONE: (801) 262-6800 
L>epj-y 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
EMERY COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
WAYNE D. POTTER, 
Defendant. 
NOTICE TO SUBMIT FOR DECISION 
Civil No. 1029 
Judge Boyd Bunnell 
Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss filed with the Court on the 18th 
day of June, 1992, by Mark T. Ethington, Attorney for Defendant, is 
now at issue and ready for decision of the Court. 
DATED and SIGNED this JZ_ day of August, 1992. 
Mark T. Ethington 
Attorney for Defendant 
• • '-• c\ n 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CERTIFICATE PF MAILINg 
I certify that I am employed by the office of Day & Barney, and 
that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Notice to 
Submit for Decision, postage pre-paid, to: 
Patricia Geary 
Emery County Attorney 
P.O. Box 249 
Castle Dale, Utah 84513-0249 
on this rO day of August, 1992. 
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR EMERY COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
vs. 
WAYNE D. POTTER, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant. ] 
l RULING ON MOTION 
i TO DISMISS 
i Criminal No. 1029 
The Defendant has filed a motion to dismiss this action 
on the ground that the Court granted a motion to suppress the 
evidence in this case on May 7, 1992, and that the State has not 
proceeded to obtain a trial date, and on the further ground that 
the State has indicated that they have no other evidence of 
criminal activity on the part of the Defendant as alleged in the 
Information in this case. 
The Plaintiff has filed no objection to the Motion. 
THE COURT HEREBY GRANTS the Motion and Orders that this 
case be dismissed. 
DATED this of September, 1992. 
u * ^ 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed a true copy of the above 
entitled RULING ON MOTION TO DISMISS by depositing the same in 
the United States Mail, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Mark T. Ethington 
DAY AND BARNEY 
Attorneys at Law 
45 East Vine Street 
Murray UT 84107 
Patricia Geary 
County Attorney for Emery County 
Post Office Box 249 
Castle Dale UT 84513 
Dated this /xJ^ day of September, 1992. 
Secretary 
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R. PAUL VAN DAM (3312) 
Attorney General 
J. KEVIN MURPHY (5768) 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 538-1021 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR EMERY COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
v. 
WAYNE D. POTTER, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Criminal No. 1029 
Judge Boyd Bunnell 
The State of Utah appeals the trial court's final order 
of dismissal in the above-entitled case, entered September 1, 1992. 
This appeal is to the Utah Court of Appeals, and is filed pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. SS 77-18a-l(2)(a) and 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1992). 
DATED this ijo day of September, 1992j_ 
[>k! 
J. KEVIN MURPHY 
Assistant Attorney general 
PATRICIA GEARY C (T^ 
Emery County Attorney 
11? Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the 
foregoing Notice of Appeal was mailed, postage prepaid, to 
Mark T. Ethington, attorney for defendant/appellee, 45 East Vine 
Street, Murray, Utah 84107, this day of September, 1992. 
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